1. This is a civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, on behalf of victims of domestic violence and their children. In this action plaintiffs seek damages and declaratory and injunctive relief to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured to them under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also seek damages for the deprivation of their rights under the New York constitution and laws. Under the misnomer of "child protection," defendants routinely harass and terrorize victims of domestic violence and their children, violating their fundamental rights.

II. JURISDICTION

2. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court by 28 U.S.C. §1343, which provides for original jurisdiction over all actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, and by 28 U.S.C. §1331, which provides jurisdiction over all cases brought pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States. The court has jurisdiction over certain of the defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367. The court has pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims.

III. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

3. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf, and, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2), on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons. Upon information and belief, the class presently consists of more than 5000 persons, and will include more than 1000 new persons each year.

4. The class is defined as:

5. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

6. There are questions of law and fact common to the class.

7. Common questions of fact include:

8. Common questions of law include:

IV. PARTIES

9. Sharwline Nicholson is the mother of the infant plaintiffs: Destinee Barnett, born on March 21, 1998, and Kendell Coles, born on February 9, 1993.

10. Defendant City of New York ("City") is a municipal corporation, incorporated pursuant to the laws of the State of New York.

11. Defendant City's Administration for Children's Services ("ACS") is authorized by New York State law to investigate complaints of child abuse and neglect and to offer rehabilitative and preventive services to both children and parents.

12. Defendant Nicholas Scoppetta is Commissioner of the Administration for Children's Services ("ACS") of the City of New York, and is sued in his individual and official capacities.

13. As Commissioner of ACS, defendant Scoppetta is responsible for making and/or approving policies for ACS, including policies regarding the investigation of alleged child abuse or maltreatment, the removal and detention of children from their families, and the training and supervision of employees in ACS.

14. As Commissioner of ACS, defendant Scoppetta is responsible for ACS's compliance with the Constitution, statutes, regulations, and common law of the United States and the State of New York.

15. Upon information and belief, from January through August 1999, defendant Nat Williams was a manager employed by ACS.

16. Upon information and belief, from January through August 1999, defendant Bethy Victorin was a supervisor employed by ACS.

17. Upon information and belief, from January through August 1999, defendant Denise Degannes was a supervisor employed by ACS.

18. Upon information and belief, from January through August 1999, defendant Lisa Clark was a caseworker employed by ACS.

19. Upon information and belief, from January through August 1999, defendant Samuel Halstion was a caseworker employed by ACS.

20. Defendant Howard Safir is the Commissioner of the New York Police Department, and is sued in his individual and official capacities.

21. As Commissioner, defendant Safir makes and/or approves those policies that govern the New York Police Department, including policies regarding the detention of children whose caretakers have been arrested.

22. Upon information and belief, in January and February 1999, defendant Vivian Lopez, formerly sued as "Jane" Lopez, was employed by the New York Police Department as a police officer.

23. Upon information and belief, in January and February 1999, defendant Arlene Irizarry was employed by the New York Police Department as a police officer.

24. Upon information and belief, in January and February 1999, defendant Vincent Strapoli, formerly sued as "John Doe," was employed by the New York Police Department as a police officer.

25. Upon information and belief, in January and February 1999, defendant Brian Martin, formerly sued as "James Roe," was employed by the New York Police Department as a police officer.

26. George E. Pataki is Governor of the State of New York. Defendant Pataki is responsible for the implementation and administration of the laws of the state of New York, including the laws providing for compensation for assigned counsel.

27. Defendant State of New York is required by the Constitution of the United States, and by the Constitution and laws of the State of New York, to provide effective assistance of counsel for parents and children in child protective proceedings, brought under N.Y. Family Court Act Article 10.

28. Defendant Jonathan Lippman is the Chief Administrative Judge of the State of New York. Defendant Lippman is responsible for the administration, regulation, and supervision of the assigned counsel panels of attorneys for indigent adults and for children in Family Court proceedings.

29. Defendant John Johnson is the Commissioner of the Office of Children and Family Services of the State of New York. As Commissioner, defendant Johnson is responsible for the administration, regulation, and supervision of the State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment.

V. STATE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

30. Defendant State of New York has established a centralized system for the collection and storage of information on allegedly abusive and neglectful parents, which is operated by the New York State Office of Children and Family Services ("OCFS"). OCFS's information repository, called the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment ("Central Register"), N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §422(1), is located in Albany, New York.

31. The Central Register maintains a telephone hotline with an "800" telephone number, staffed by telephone operators 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in order to receive complaints of child abuse, child neglect, or child maltreatment. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §422(2)(a). The state requires certain individuals to report to the Central Register whenever "they have reasonable cause to suspect that a child coming before them in their professional or official capacity is an abused or maltreated child." N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §413.

32. These individuals include "any physician; surgeon; medical examiner; coroner; dentist; dental hygienist; osteopath; optometrist; chiropractor; podiatrist; resident; intern; psychologist; registered nurse; hospital personnel engaged in the admission, examination, care or treatment of persons; a Christian Science practitioner; school official; social services worker; day care center worker; provider of family or group family day care; employee or volunteer in a residential care facility . . . or any other child care or foster care worker; mental health professional; peace officer; police officer; district attorney or assistant district attorney; investigator employed in the office of a district attorney; or other law enforcement official." N. Y. Soc. Serv. L. §413(1).

33. The system encourages over-reporting of parents by penalizing the failure to report and protecting false reporting. A person who is required to report suspected child abuse, neglect, or maltreatment may be subject to criminal prosecution under N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §420(1) or civil liability under N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §420(2) for erroneously failing to do so.

34. Anyone who makes a report is entitled to immunity from all liability if the report turns out to be false, unless the wrongfully-reported parent proves that the reporter acted in bad faith. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §419.

35. In addition to persons required by law to do so, anyone who wants to report that a parent has abused or neglected a child has the right to call the hotline. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §414.

36. The report may even be made anonymously, and many reports are.

37. Whenever a person makes a report of suspected child abuse, neglect, or maltreatment to one of the local child abuse offices, that office must transmit the report to the Central Register. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §415.

38. Upon receiving a complaint of suspected child abuse, neglect, or maltreatment, the telephone operator who answers the hotline must determine whether to accept the complaint, i.e., whether the allegations, if true, would be legally sufficient to constitute child abuse, neglect, or maltreatment. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §422(2)(b).

39. Upon information and belief, the State Central Register has a policy of accepting allegations of domestic violence.

40. If the telephone operator accepts the complaint, the operator records the complaint on paper and relays it by telephone or facsimile machine to the office of the county Department of Social Services ("county department") in the county in which the child is living or staying. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §422(2)(b). In New York City (which is considered one county), the report is transmitted to the appropriate borough field office of the Administration for Children's Services.

41. ACS is responsible for investigating all complaints of suspected child abuse, neglect, and maltreatment that they receive from the Central Register. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §424(6).

42. ACS has no discretion to weed out complaints that ACS staff believe are legally insufficient, because the decision that a complaint is legally sufficient has already been made by the Office of Children and Family Services in Albany.

43. ACS must make a preliminary assessment within seven days of receiving each report. ACS must send a report, containing that assessment, along with information as to the progress of their investigation, to the Central Register. N. Y. Soc. Serv. L. §424(3).

44. ACS must complete each investigation within 60 days of receiving the report of suspected child abuse, neglect, or maltreatment. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §424(7).

45. At the end of the investigation, ACS must determine whether there is "some credible evidence" of the allegations in the complaint. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §412(6). If so, ACS determines that the report is "indicated." If not, ACS determines that the report is "unfounded." N. Y. Soc. Serv. L. §§424(7); 412(5). ACS transmits the determination, as well as the reasons for the determination, to the Central Register. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §424(3).

46. Both the Central Register and OFCS accept the conclusion of ACS and do not make independent assessments as to whether a complaint is "indicated" or "unfounded." If ACS determines that a complaint is unfounded, the Central Register expunges or seals all information regarding the family from its files.

47. If ACS determines that there is some credible evidence to support the charges in the complaint, or any additional charges that ACS staff may have discovered during the course of the investigation, the Central Register retains all information on the family in its database and in its library until the family's youngest child reaches the age of 28. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §422(6).

48. At any time during the 60 day investigation, ACS has discretion to commence child protective proceedings against the parents in the Family Court. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §1032(a); N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §397(2)(b).

49. If ACS determines that a complaint is "indicated," ACS may commence child protective proceedings against the parents after the 60 day period has elapsed. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §424(11). ACS acts as the petitioner (prosecutor) in the Family Court. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §1032(a).

50. Child protective proceedings resemble criminal prosecutions in that they involve three types of hearing: first, a preliminary hearing, to determine who will have custody of the child while the case is pending, N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§1027, 1028; second a fact-finding hearing to determine whether the parents have abused or neglected the child; and, finally, a dispositional hearing to determine where the child should live. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§1044, 1045, 1047(a).

51. In child protective proceedings in the Family Court, indigent adults who are charged with child abuse or neglect have a right to have counsel appointed to represent them. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §262(a)(i). The children who are the subjects of the proceeding have a right to have law guardians appointed for them. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §249.

52. New York law provides that the counties (including the City of New York) will pay the attorneys who represent parents in Family Court cases, and sets a maximum hourly rate for attorneys of $25.00 per hour for work performed out of court and $40.00 per hour for work performed in court. New York law sets the maximum compensation for attorneys at $800.00 per case. New York law provides that the state will pay law guardians for children in Family Court cases, and provides the same maximum rate of compensation for the law guardians.

53. The information contained in the Central Register is nominally confidential, but so many individuals and organizations are entitled to that information, or at least portions of the information, that confidentiality exists in name only. The following individuals and organizations have access to information in the Central Register: physicians; persons taking children into protective custody; child-caring (foster care) agencies; courts; grand juries; legislative committees; prospective employers of individuals who will have "the potential for regular and substantial contact with children"; agencies which license individuals who will have contact with children; the state commission on the quality of care of the mentally disabled; probation services; district attorneys; police departments; the New York City Department of Investigation; foster care agencies, day care centers, the department of education, and the State Division for Youth; preventive services programs; adoption investigators; and child abuse investigators from other states. N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §422(4)(A).

54. When an individual applies for a job in which she will have the potential for regular and substantial contact with children, the prospective employer is required to check with the State Central Register to ascertain whether the applicant is listed on the State Central Register as an abusive or neglectful mother.

55. If the applicant is listed on the Register, the employer may not hire the applicant unless the employer explains in writing why the employer has decided to hire a person with a record as an abusive or neglectful parent.

56. As a practical matter, people whose names are on the list of abusive or neglectful parents in the State Central Register cannot obtain employment in the field of working with children, because no employer will hire an applicant whose name is on the list.

V. FACTS

57. In January, 1999, plaintiff was living together with her children, the infant plaintiffs herein.

58. On January 27, 1999, Claude Barnett came to plaintiff's home and assaulted plaintiff, causing severe injuries.

59. Throughout said assault, infant plaintiff Destinee was asleep in another room, and infant plaintiff Kendell was at school.

60. Claude Barnett, the father of infant plaintiff Destinee, had separated from plaintiff prior to the birth of Destinee, and moved to another state.

61. Prior to January 27, 1999, Claude Barnett had never behaved violently toward plaintiff.

62. Claude Barnett has never behaved violently toward infant plaintiffs.

63. Immediately after assaulting plaintiff on January 27, 1999, Claude Barnett fled. Plaintiff called the police and Emergency Medical Services immediately.

64. Two police officers arrived shortly thereafter, followed by an Emergency Medical Service team.

65. The police officers interviewed plaintiff about the assault. They saw that plaintiff was bleeding profusely from a head wound, and that there was blood all over her apartment. They also saw that Destinee was asleep and that Kendell was not at home.

66. When the Emergency Medical Service team arrived, they wrapped bandages around plaintiff's head, put a collar around her neck to immobilize it, and strapped her onto a stretcher.

67. Plaintiff arranged for her neighbor to care for Destinee and to pick up Kendell from school, and was then taken to the hospital by ambulance.

68. Two other police officers came to the hospital and interviewed the plaintiff in the emergency room. The police asked plaintiff for the names of her relatives.

69. Plaintiff cooperated fully and explained that Claude Barnett had attacked her while Destinee was asleep and Kendell was at school.

70. Sometime during the evening of January 27, 1999, defendants Stropoli and Martin burst into the apartment of plaintiff's neighbor, with their guns drawn.

71. Defendants Stropoli and Martin searched the apartment, awakened Kendell and Destinee, and then announced that they were taking Kendell and Destinee away from the neighbor.

72. Defendants Stropoli and Martin brought Kendell and Destiny to the precinct house.

73. Upon information and belief, defendant Irizarry reported to the State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (the child abuse hotline) that plaintiff had mistreated her children by engaging in domestic violence in their presence.

74. Said report was false, and defendant Irizarry knew or should have known that it was false.

75. Upon information and belief, said report was transmitted electronically to ACS, where the case was assigned to defendant Halstion for investigation.

76. Upon information and belief, while Kendell and Destinee were at the precinct house, plaintiff's cousin came to the precinct house and sought to take Kendell and Destinee to her home.

77. Upon information and belief, defendant Halstion instructed defendants Irizarry, Roe, and Doe not to release Kendell and Destinee to plaintiff's cousin, but rather to transport Kendell and Destinee to Halstion's office at ACS.

78. Upon information and belief, defendant Lopez transported Kendell and Destinee to ACS, and left Kendell and Destinee with defendant Halstion.

79. Upon information and belief, defendant Halstion placed Kendell and Destinee in a foster home.

80. On January 28, 1999, defendant Halstion telephoned plaintiff and told her that the City of New York had taken custody of her children. Defendant Halstion refused to tell plaintiff where her children were staying and refused to permit plaintiff to speak to Kendell and Destinee.

81. Upon information and belief, on or about January 28, 1999, agents of defendant Scoppetta transferred plaintiffs' case to defendant Clark for investigation.

82. Upon information and belief, defendant Scoppetta assigned defendants Degannes and Victorin to supervise defendant Clark. Upon information and belief, defendant Scoppetta assigned defendant Williams to supervise defendants Degannes and Victorin.

83. Upon information and belief, on February 2, 1999, defendant Clark, acting with the consent and pursuant to the directives of defendants Williams, Victorin, and Degannes, commenced child protective proceedings against plaintiff in the Family Court of the State of New York, Kings County.

84. Said defendants alleged that plaintiff had neglected both of her children by engaging in acts of domestic violence in front of infant plaintiff, Destinee and that the January 27 incident was only one of several such acts. Defendant also swore that Claude Barnett hit infant plaintiff Kendell on the mouth. Said allegations were false and defendants Clark, Victorin, Degannes, and Williams knew or should have known that the allegations were false.

85. Upon information and belief, on February 2, 1999, defendant Clark, acting with the consent and pursuant to the directives of defendants Williams, Degannes, and Victorin, obtained an order from the Brooklyn Family Court, ex parte, permitting defendants City and Scoppetta to retain custody of infant plaintiffs Kendell and Destinee.

86. Defendants detained Kendell and Destinee until February 18, 1999, when defendants finally released the infant plaintiffs to plaintiff. Plaintiff never consented to the detention of the infant plaintiffs.

87. During the three weeks that Kendell and Destinee were in defendants' custody, defendants failed to send Kendell to school.

88. After releasing the infant plaintiffs to plaintiff, defendants continued the Family Court proceedings against plaintiff for six more months, during which time plaintiff was required to appear in court on many occasions.

89. Upon information and belief, on March 15, 1999, defendant Clark, acting through the attorney for ACS and with the consent and pursuant to directives of defendants Williams, Victorin and Degannes, obtained a warrant from the family court for plaintiff's arrest.

90. Defendant Clark procured the warrant by providing false and misleading information to the Family Court.

91. Defendant Clark knew or should have known that her representations were false.

92. Agents of defendant Safir arrested plaintiff on April 7, 1999, pursuant to said warrant.

93. Plaintiff was held in custody for most of the day, and was finally released in the late afternoon or early evening.

94. Finally, on August 5, 1999, defendants Scoppetta, Williams, Clark, Victorin, and Degannes withdrew all charges against plaintiff.

95. Upon information and belief, defendants Scoppetta, Williams, Clark, Victorin, and Degannes, despite withdrawing all charges against plaintiff, made an administrative determination that plaintiff had neglected her children.

96. Upon information and belief, defendants Williams, Clark, and Degannes notified agents of defendant Johnson that plaintiff was a neglectful mother.

97. Agents of defendant Johnson accordingly placed plaintiff's name on their list of abusive and neglectful parents in the State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment.

98. Defendant Johnson and his agents will disseminate the information that plaintiff's name is on the List of abusive parents to any prospective employers in any field that involves working with children.

99. Plaintiff will be unable to obtain employment in any field that involves working with children as long as her name is on the List.

100. Plaintiff is entitled to an administrative hearing to clear her name.

101. Plaintiff requested such a hearing more than a year ago, and defendant Johnson still has not scheduled such a hearing.

102. Within ninety days after the claim herein sued upon arose, plaintiffs caused a notice of claim in writing to be served upon defendant City. Said claim has not been paid, and more than thirty days has elapsed since the service of the notice.

VI. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

103. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 102.

104. Upon information and belief, defendants City, Scoppetta, and Safir have a policy of removing and detaining children from mothers who are victims of domestic violence without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health, without due process of law, and based upon constitutionally inadequate investigations.

105. Acting pursuant to said policy, and without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mother presented an imminent danger to the children's life or health, and without due process of law, and based upon a constitutionally inadequate investigation, defendants Halstion, Stropoli, Martin, Irizarry, and Lopez removed infant plaintiffs from plaintiff.

106. Acting pursuant to said policy, without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health and without due process of law, and based upon a constitutionally inadequate investigation, other employees of ACS and the New York Police Department have removed, and/or will remove, infant class members from adult class members.

107. Acting pursuant to said policy, without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mother presented an imminent danger to the children's life or health, without due process of law, and based on a constitutionally inadequate investigation, defendants Williams, Clark, Victorin, and Degannes detained the infant plaintiffs in government custody for three weeks.

108. Acting pursuant to said policy, and without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health, without due process of law, and based on constitutionally inadequate investigations, other employees of ACS have detained and/or will detain infant class members in government custody.

109. Said policy, and the removal and detention effectuated pursuant to said policy, constituted an unlawful interference with plaintiff's liberty interest in the care and custody of her children, the infant plaintiffs herein, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Said policy, and its implementation, were gross deviations from acceptable professional conduct.

110. Said policy and its implementation, constituted unlawful interference with infant plaintiffs' liberty interest in being cared for by their mother.

111. In the alternative, defendants City, Scoppetta, and Safir failed to adopt policies requiring their employees to remove children only if they had probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health, only if they provided due process of law to children and parents, and only if they had investigated to determine said factors. Defendants City, Scoppetta, and Safir knew or should have known that said failure would cause defendants' agents and employees to remove and detain children without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health and without due process of law, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

112. Defendants City, Scoppetta, and Safir knew or should have known that their failure to adopt a policy requiring their employees to afford plaintiffs and class members due process of law in connection with the removal of the infant class members would cause defendants' agents and employees to remove and detain infant class members from the adult class members without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

113. Defendants City, Scoppetta, and Safir knew or should have known that their failure to adopt a policy regarding the removal of infant class members from adult class members would cause defendants' agents and employees to violate infant class members' and adult class members' rights to live together as a family without state intervention, contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

114. As a result of the defendants' actions, plaintiff and adult class members suffered or will suffer the loss of freedom and of the custody and services of their children; the infant plaintiffs infant class members have suffered or will suffer the loss of liberty and of the care and guidance of their mother; and all three named plaintiffs suffered extreme humiliation, pain and suffering, terror, mental anguish, and depression.

VII. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

115. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 114.

116. Defendants City, Safir, and Scoppetta provided grossly inadequate and unprofessional training and supervision to their agents and employees regarding:

117. Defendants City, Safir, and Scoppetta knew or should have known that their employees were improperly trained and supervised in said issues.

118. Defendants City, Safir, and Scoppetta knew or should have know that their employees would confront said issues in their work and that, without training, they would make the wrong decisions on said issues.

119. By reason of their lack of training, defendants Stropoli, Martin, Lopez, Irizarry, Clark and Halstion, improperly removed the infant plaintiffs from the custody of plaintiff.

120. By reason of the foregoing, employees of ACS and the New York Police Department have improperly removed and/or will improperly remove the infant class members from the custody of the adult class members.

121. By reason of their lack of training, defendants Clark, Williams, Victorin, and Degannes detained infant plaintiffs from plaintiff for three weeks without adequate notice to plaintiff, without adequate investigation, without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mother presented an imminent danger to the children's life or health and/or without due process of law.

122. By reason of the foregoing, employees of ACS and the New York Police Department have detained and/or will detain infant class members from the custody of adult class members, without adequate notice to adult class members, without adequate investigation, without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health, and/or without due process of law.

123. As a result of the defendants' actions, plaintiff and adult class members suffered or will suffer the loss of freedom and of the custody and services of their children; the infant plaintiffs and infant class members have suffered or will suffer the loss of liberty and of the care and guidance of their mother; and all three named plaintiffs suffered extreme humiliation, pain and suffering, terror, mental anguish, and depression.

VIII. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

124. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 123.

125. By removing and detaining the infant plaintiffs from plaintiff, defendants unlawfully interfered with plaintiff's custody of her minor children.

126. As a result of the defendants' actions, plaintiff suffered the loss of freedom and of the custody and services of her children; the infant plaintiffs suffered the loss of liberty and of the care and guidance of their mother; and all plaintiffs suffered extreme humiliation, pain and suffering, terror, mental anguish, and depression.

IX. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

127. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 126.

128. By removing and detaining the infant plaintiffs, defendants unlawfully imprisoned said infant plaintiffs.

129. By procuring an arrest warrant based upon false statements, and causing the execution of said warrant, defendants unlawfully imprisoned the adult plaintiff.

130. As a result of the defendants' actions, plaintiff suffered the loss of freedom and of the custody and services of her children; the infant plaintiffs suffered the loss of liberty and of the care and guidance of their mother; and all plaintiffs suffered extreme humiliation, pain and suffering, terror, mental anguish, and depression.

X. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

131. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 130.

132. Upon information and belief, defendants City, Safir and Scoppetta had, at all times material, a policy of filing child protective proceedings maliciously and without probable cause against mothers who are victims of domestic violence.

133. Acting pursuant to said policy, on or about February 2, 1999, defendants Williams, Victorin, Degannes and Clark, commenced child protective proceedings against plaintiff Nicholson maliciously and without probable cause.

134. Acting pursuant to said policy, from February 2, 1999, until August 5,1999, defendants City, Scoppetta, Clark, Williams, Degannes and Victorin continued the prosecution of plaintiff in the Family Court.

135. Defendants City, Scoppetta, Clark, Williams, Degannes, and Victorin caused said charges to be filed and continued wilfully, maliciously, without probable cause, and for reasons other than to see justice done.

136. On August 5, 1999, all of the charges were resolved and determined in plaintiff's favor.

137. In commencing and continuing said charges, defendants City, Scoppetta, Clark, Williams, Degannes, and Victorin, acting under color of state law, in gross and wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights, violated plaintiff's right to be free of malicious prosecution, under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

138. In the alternative, defendants City, Safir and Scoppetta failed to adopt any policies or standards for deciding whether to file child protective proceedings in Family Court against mothers who are victims of domestic violence.

139. Defendants City, Safir and Scoppetta knew or should have known that their failure to adopt policies or standards would cause their employees to abuse government power by filing child protective proceedings maliciously against adult class members.

140. As a result of the defendants' actions, plaintiff suffered the loss of the custody and services of her children; the infant plaintiffs suffered the loss of liberty and of the care and guidance of their mother; and all plaintiffs suffered extreme humiliation, pain and suffering, terror, mental anguish, and depression.

XI. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

141. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 140.

142. In commencing and continuing child protective proceedings against plaintiff in the Family Court, defendants prosecuted plaintiff maliciously and without probable cause, in violation of the laws of the State of New York.

143. As a result of the defendants' actions, plaintiff suffered the loss of the custody and services of her children; the infant plaintiffs suffered the loss of liberty and of the care and guidance of their mother; and all of the plaintiffs suffered extreme humiliation, pain and suffering, terror, mental anguish, and depression.

XII. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

144. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 143.

145. All of the defendants had a duty to act with reasonable care toward plaintiff and with the highest degree of care toward the infant plaintiffs.

146. Defendants' removal and detention of the infant plaintiffs and defendants' prosecution of plaintiff constituted gross breaches of said duty and gross deviations from accepted professional standards.

147. As a result of the defendants' actions, plaintiff suffered the loss of freedom and of the custody and services of her children; the infant plaintiffs suffered the loss of liberty and of the care and guidance of their mother; and all plaintiffs suffered extreme humiliation, pain and suffering, terror, mental anguish, and depression.

XIII. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

148. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 147.

149. When City defendants commence child protective proceedings in the Family Court, charging adult class members with child neglect or child abuse, adult class members have a right to counsel; and indigent adult class members have a right to have counsel appointed to represent them.

150. The right to counsel is protected by the New York State Constitution. See, Matter of Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133, 285 N.E.2d 288 (1972). That right is also guaranteed by statute. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §262(a)(i).

151. Moreover, because of the complex nature of child protective proceedings that charge battered women with neglecting their children solely or primarily because they are victims of domestic violence, indigent battered women have a presumptive right under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution to have counsel appointed to represent them. See, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153 (1981).

152. When City defendants commence child protective proceedings in the Family Court, the children who are the subjects of the proceedings have the right to representation by a law guardian. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §249(a).

153. Defendant State of New York has established a system of panels of attorneys who are certified to accept assignments of cases in the Family Court, including assignments to represent domestic violence victims who are charged with child neglect. N.Y. County Law §722-b; see also N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §245; N.Y. Judiciary L. §35.

154. One panel (the First Department Panel) provides representation to individuals with cases in Family Court in Manhattan and the Bronx. The other panel (the Second Department Panel) provides representation to individuals with cases in Family Court in Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island.

155. Many children in child protective proceedings are represented by the Legal Aid Society, under a contract with the State of New York.

156. Most of the children who are not represented by the Legal Aid Society are represented by attorneys selected from the appropriate assigned counsel panel.

157. Defendants State of New York and Pataki limit the compensation for assigned counsel to $25.00 per hour for work performed out of court, and $40.00 per hour for work performed in court.

158. Defendants State of New York and Pataki impose a maximum of $800.00 for representing a parent or child in the Family Court. Said maximum may be exceeded only by order of the Family Court in an individual case, based upon extraordinary circumstances.

159. Those rates are woefully inadequate to attract competent counsel to represent indigent battered women and their children in child protective proceedings in the New York Family Court.

160. As a result of the appallingly low rate of compensation to attorneys, fewer and fewer attorneys are willing to participate on the assigned counsel panels in the First and Second Departments.

161. As a result of the appallingly low rate of compensation to attorneys, those attorneys who agree to serve on the panel and represent battered women or their children in child protective proceedings in the Family Court are unable to perform the in-depth investigations and preparation work that those complex cases require.

162. In addition, the relatively few attorneys who agree to serve on the panel are pressured to take on far more cases than they can handle effectively.

163. In restricting the number of lawyers who are available to represent infant and indigent adult class members in child protective proceedings in the New York Family Court, defendants Pataki and State have violated, are violating, and will violate the class members' right to due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and class members' right to counsel, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the constitution and laws of the State of New York.

XIV. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

164. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 163.

165. In addition to limiting the number of attorneys available to represent battered women and their children by the low rate of compensation, defendants State of New York and Lippman further limit the availability of competent counsel to battered women and their children by prohibiting attorneys from specializing in the subject area that they know best.

166. Defendant Lippman's rules require that all attorneys on the panels in the First and Second Department serve a minimum of six intake days each year.

167. Specifically, defendant Lippman's regulations require that the attorneys be present in the Family Court on each of their intake days, to accept assignments on all new cases in which counsel may be assigned, including guardianship cases, custody cases, cases to terminate parental rights, family offense cases, juvenile delinquency cases, paternity cases, and certain types of child support cases.

168. As a result of defendant Lippman's refusal to permit attorneys to specialize, those attorneys who have an interest and experience in representing domestic violence victims and/or children of domestic violence victims decline to serve on the assigned counsel panels, thereby depriving said women and children of experienced counsel.

169. As a result of said refusal, defendants Lippman and State have violated, are violating, and will violate the class members' right to due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and class members' right to counsel, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the constitution and laws of the State of New York.

XV. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

170. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 169.

171. Defendants State and Pataki provide inadequate funding to the Legal Aid Society for representation of children in child protective proceedings in the Family Court.

172. As a result of the failure to provide adequate funding, the Legal Aid Society has grave difficulty providing zealous and effective representation to the infant class members who are involved in child protective proceedings in the Family Court.

173. As a result of said failure, children in Family Court cases are deprived of their right to effective assistance of counsel and to due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and the constitution and laws of the State of New York.

XVI. ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

174. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 173.

175. As part of the right to counsel who will advocate zealously and effectively on their behalf, battered women and children with child protective proceedings in the Family Court have the right to the assistance of experts to assist in their representation in Family Court proceedings.

176. Defendants Lippman, Pataki, and State of New York routinely fail to comply with their statutory and constitutional obligation by failing to make sufficient funds available for experts.

177. As a result of said failures, defendants Pataki and State have violated, are violating, and will violate the class members' right to due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the constitution and laws of the State of New York.

XVII. TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

178. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 177.

179. Upon information and belief, defendants Johnson and Scoppetta have a policy and/or practice of interpreting the New York statutes that define child abuse and maltreatment in an unconstitutionally overly broad manner.

180. With regard to class members, defendants Johnson and Scoppetta have a policy and/or practice of determining that a report of child abuse or maltreatment is "indicated," i.e., supported by some credible evidence, based solely or primarily upon the fact that the mother is or has been a victim of domestic violence.

181. As a result of said overly broad interpretation, defendants have labelled members of the adult plaintiff class as abusive or neglectful solely or primarily because they are victims of domestic violence, and have placed the names of said class members on the list of abusive parents in the database maintained by the State Central Register.

182. As a result of said overly broad interpretation, adult class members are barred from employment in their chosen fields.

183. By placing class members' names on the list of abusive and neglectful parents in the database maintained by the State Central Register, defendants Scoppetta and Johnson have deprived, are depriving, and will deprive class members of their liberty, their privacy, and their right to seek employment in their chosen profession, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and have violated their rights under the constitution and laws of the State of New York.

XVIII. THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

184. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 183.

185. Defendants City and Scoppetta have a policy or practice of insisting that adult class members leave their homes and go to live in domestic violence shelters as a condition of retaining or regaining custody of their children.

186. Some class members do not wish to leave their homes and uproot their children, but defendants City and Scoppetta and their agents and employees force the adult class members to leave their homes.

187. Other class members wish to leave their homes and go into domestic violence shelters. Those class members invariably cannot find places in domestic violence shelters because defendant City provides a grossly inadequate number of places in shelters for mothers who are victims of domestic violence.

188. Because of City defendants' failure to provide sufficient shelter space, some adult and child class members must stay in the office of the City's Emergency Assistance Unit for days and nights until a place becomes available in a domestic violence shelter. The office is an inadequate and inappropriate place for children and their mothers to live. Moreover, the office has no security, leaving the mothers and children accessible to their batterers.

189. By reason of the foregoing, defendants City and Scoppetta have violated the rights of adult class members and child class members to live together, free of government interference, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and the constitution and laws of the State of New York.

XIX. FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

190. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 189.

191. Defendant City has a policy of barring women without children from its domestic violence shelters.

192. As a result, adult class members whose children have already been removed and placed in foster care are unable to find shelter in domestic violence shelters.

193. Defendant Scoppetta and his agents and employees have a policy and practice of refusing to return children to their mothers who are domestic violence victims, and of keeping those children in foster care, until the mothers go into domestic violence shelters.

194. The conflicting policies of defendant Scoppetta and defendant City operate to keep children and their mothers separated unnecessarily, in violation of the United States Constitution and the constitution and laws of the State of New York.

XX. FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

195. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 194.

196. When defendants City and Scoppetta seek to separate children from the custody of their parents who are domestic violence victims, the parents and children are entitled to due process of law, in the form of pre-deprivation hearings. In emergency situations, where there is insufficient time to hold pre-deprivation hearings, the parents and children are entitled to prompt post-deprivation hearings.

197. Defendants State of New York and Pataki fail to allocate sufficient resources to the Family Court to provide pre-deprivation hearings and prompt post-deprivation hearings to all parents and children who are legally entitled to such hearings.

198. There are not enough judges, not enough court personnel, and not enough courtrooms to hold prompt hearings for all parents and children.

199. As a result, children and their parents are unnecessarily separated for protracted periods of time.

200. Said separations violate the rights of the parents and the children to due process of law, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the constitution and laws of the State of New York.

WHEREFORE plaintiffs respectfully request that judgment be entered:

Dated: New York, New York,
July 12, 2001

__________________________________
CAROLYN A. KUBITSCHEK (CK6415)
LANSNER & KUBITSCHEK
Attorney for Plaintiffs
325 Broadway
New York, New York 10007
(212) 349-0900

____________________________
JILL M. ZUCCARDY (JZ3276)
Sanctuary for Families Center for Battered
Women's Legal Services
67 Wall Street, Suite 2211
New York, New York 10005
(212) 349-6009

Attorneys for Plaintiffs